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Hatch-Waxman – Thoughtful Planning or Just
Piling On: A Consideration of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Proposed Changes*
Brian Urevig
INTRODUCTION
The regulatory environment governing the pharmaceutical
development process attempts to achieve two seemingly
opposing goals – promoting new drug innovation and
expediting the entry of generic versions of the same drugs into
the market. The most recent attempt to achieve these goals is
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
1
of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.
2
Although unquestionably successful in achieving these goals,
the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have created incentives for
3
anticompetitive activity within the pharmaceutical industry.
Brand-name manufacturers have arguably found ways to
4
For example, brand-name
subvert the law’s intent.
manufacturers have been accused of filing patent extensions for
inconsequential changes to existing pharmaceuticals shortly
before the original patent expires in order to stave off generic

* This note is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
2. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Hatch-Waxman
Act results in consumer savings of $8 to $10 billion annually. Competition in
the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 17 (2001)
(statement of Molly Boast, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission) [hereinafter Boast, Statement of the FTC]. This has been caused
by the creation of an environment that encourages both new drug development
and the use of generic equivalents. See id.
3. See id. at 17-18.
4. See id. (noting that “the commission has observed conduct suggesting
that some firms may be exploiting the statutory and regulatory scheme be
reaching agreements to delay the introduction of generic drugs to the
market”).
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competition. In addition, recent litigation has indicated that
pharmaceutical companies (both generic and brand-name
manufacturers) that were, theoretically, competitors, may have
6
been forming collusive arrangements with one other. This has
resulted in the accusation that generic equivalents are being
unlawfully squeezed out of the marketplace (or never allowed
7
to enter) through violations of the antitrust laws. Brand-name
manufacturers, however, have countered that they are not
abusing the Hatch-Waxman Act, but rather are being abused
8
by it. They argue that some of the provisions of the HatchWaxman Act have created perverse incentives for generic
manufacturers to initiate frivolous lawsuits designed only to
result in large settlement payments to the generic
9
Furthermore, brand-name manufacturers
manufacturer.
contend that the effective length of patent protection is
insufficient to allow them to recover the enormous costs
10
required to develop, test, and market a new pharmaceutical.
Due to the complexity and importance of this situation, in 2001
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated a study
designed to provide information to Congress to use in
11
consideration of possible reform to the Hatch-Waxman Act. In

5. Cf. Editorial, Right Track on Generic Drugs, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 23, 2002, at A22, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All
(citing President Bush’s announcement that the FDA “would propose rules to
stop drug manufacturers from filing multiple patent-infringement lawsuits,
which can block generic medicines for years”).
6. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 20.
7. See James T. O’Reilly, Prescription Pricing & Monopoly Extension:
Elderly Drug Users Lose the Shell Game of Post-Patent Exclusivity, 29 N. KY.
L. REV. 413 (2002). O’Reilly first notes that “the [brand-name patent holder]
can pay the first generic firm to keep its drug away from the market, and
block other generic competitors for at least six months.” Id. at 414. But, as
O’Reilly observes, “[the FTC] has challenged both the monopolist’s practice
and the generic’s sellout of consumers.” Id.
8. Waxman-Hatch Has Boosted Generics, but Jury still out on Effects on
Innovators, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Jan. 6, 2003.
9. Id.
10. See Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a
Pill for the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to
Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 332-33 (1999). Reid discusses the
limitations contained within the Hatch-Waxman Act patent term extension
provisions and asserts that “while congress designed the extension provisions
to protect the pioneer industry’s returns on its original investments, which
even before the Act’s passage often did not cover research and development
costs, the [Congressional Budget Office] admits that protection from the
extensions has been less than complete, meaning that pioneer companies
operate on an even thinner margin than before.” Id. at 333.
11. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 18.

2003]

HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

369

July 2002, the FTC completed the study and issued its report
12
containing proposed changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The purpose of this Note is to review the FTC’s proposed
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Note will first
describe the regulatory and economic environment in which
pharmaceutical companies currently operate. Next, a summary
of recent litigation will provide an understanding of current
controversial pharmaceutical industry practices. The new
proposals by the FTC will be discussed thereafter, followed by a
discussion of their potential effect on the pharmaceutical
industry. This Note concludes that the proposed FTC changes
may aid in preventing some of the collusion between
pharmaceutical companies. However, this Note also concludes
that there are several deficiencies in the proposals that should
be addressed to more fully alleviate the problems in the
pharmaceutical industry.
I. BACKGROUND
The price of pharmaceuticals has been under intense
13
The significance of
scrutiny during the past decade.
pharmaceutical prices can be demonstrated by a review of the
financial information involved. During 2000, total spending on
14
In 2001,
pharmaceuticals rose 18.8% to 131.9 billion.
15
spending increased again, this time by 17%.
Furthermore,
pharmaceutical spending is predicted to reach approximately
16
During 2001, brand-name
$4 trillion over the next decade.
pharmaceuticals sold for an average of $72 per prescription,

12. See FTC GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY, at ii (July 2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY].
During the past summer, the Senate passed the McCain-Schumer bill. See
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001).
This bill provides more drastic recommendations than the recent GENERIC
DRUG ENTRY STUDY. See Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse?
Collusive Settlements between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 328-29 (2002). However, this bill has not been
passed by the House of Representatives, and is not expected to do so. Cf. id. at
329 n.104. In addition, President George W. Bush recently proposed changes
to the Hatch-Waxman Act that are very similar to the recommendations in the
FTC report. See Scott Gottlieb, Patent Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at
A18 and compare with GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, at ii.
13. Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 17.
14. Id.
15. See Holly Rosenkrantz, Bush Proposes Rules to Shrink Prescription
Drug Costs, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002.
16. See id.
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compared with $17 for their generic equivalent. Furthermore,
over the next five years, patents are set to expire on brand18
The
name drugs that currently have sales of $20 billion.
implications of either extending some of these patents or
having generic equivalents take their place will clearly affect
the financial health of both consumers and pharmaceutical
19
manufacturers.
However, the situation is not as simple as replacing brandname pharmaceuticals with generic drugs in an effort to reduce
costs to the lowest amount possible. There is a delicate balance
to maintain. Brand-name manufacturers must continue to be
given incentives to bring new and improved pharmaceuticals
20
into the marketplace and to be compensated for doing so.
New pharmaceuticals may be increasingly expensive, but they
may also minimize the need for or prevent even more expensive

17. See Editorial, supra note 5.
18. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 18. The potential
impact of this can be demonstrated by the fact that when a generic medication
first competes with a brand-name pharmaceutical, the price for the brandname medication drops by 25%. Id. at 14. Furthermore, when additional
generic brands enter the market, the price can drop to 50% of its original
price. Id. at 14, 18.
19. For an example of the impact of patent protection over a
pharmaceutical, as well as the extent to which brand-name manufacturers
rely on their successful products, consider the situation of Schering-Plough
and its allergy drug “Claritin.” At one time, sales of Claritin accounted for $3
billion of Schering’s $9 billion in total annual revenue. See Matthew Herper,
Schering-Plough’s
Earnings
Limbo,
at
(January
10,
2003)
http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/10/cx_mh_0110sgp.html (last visited Mar. 01,
2003). However, the medication can now be sold without a prescription and is
subject to intense generic competition. See id. (citing competition from Wyeth,
Inc.’s sales of loratadine, the active ingredient in Claritin). Because Claritin is
now sold without a prescription, Schering-Plough decreased the price from
over $3 to just $1 per tablet. Id. Currently, the generic manufacturer has
been marketing its equivalent at less then seventy cents per tablet. Id. The
end result of all of this is that sales of Claritin are now expected to bring
Schering-Plough only $400 million per year. Id. Predictably, this has resulted
in significantly lower sales and earnings estimates, along with a plummeting
stock price. Id. Clearly consumers will benefit through lower prices on
Claritin. However, the Claritin saga also demonstrates how dependant brandname manufacturers can be on just a few successful products for a significant
amount of their sales. When one of these products loses patent protection, the
implications are clear. The loss of protection indicates the importance of
innovation to brand-name manufacturers: innovation allows them to have a
continuous pipeline of patent protected pharmaceuticals that can replace those
drugs that lose patent protection.
20. A lack of innovation has obvious implications – prices will be reduced
in the short-term, but in twenty years, we will have substantially the same
medications in our arsenal as we have today.
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surgical
procedures
and
extended
hospitalization.
Furthermore, in order to develop an approved brand-name
drug, a pharmaceutical company can spend anywhere from
22
$200 – 500 million. Even after a manufacturer receives Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for a brand-name
medication there is no certainty of profit. Less than one in
three drugs approved by the FDA will eventually return a
23
profit. Furthermore, risks of drug-design-defect litigation as
well as competition from both generic and other brand-name
drug manufacturers result in a highly competitive market for
24
Finally, the United States
new pharmaceuticals.
pharmaceutical industry is also an important source of
innovation for the world.
Unites States pharmaceutical
companies “developed almost half of the new [pharmaceutical]
25
products released worldwide between 1970 and 1992.”
A. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
1. Food and Drug Regulation
The

current

FDA

26

regulations

require

that

a


21. See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical
Marketplace: A Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent
Expiration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 36 (2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
22. Mandy Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic
Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on
Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 497 (2002); see also ROY LEVY, FTC, THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST
ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE 175-77 (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmaceutical/drugrep.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2003). Levy notes that the nominal cost to produce a “new chemical entity”
went from $135.15 million in 1985 to $423.05 million in 1995, with a high of
$504.61 million in 1994. Id. at 177, Table A.4.
23. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 499. Furthermore, prior to clinical
testing, pharmaceutical companies typically screen some 5,000 to 10,000
compounds with only five of these usually reaching the clinical testing phase.
LEVY, supra note 22, at 178. Of these five, only one typically received FDA
approval. Id.
24. Wilson, supra note 22, at 499-500.
25. Reid, supra note 10, at 330.
26. The authority of the FDA derives from the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), ch. 675, § 701(a) 52 Stat. 1040, 1055 (1938) (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000)) which states that the secretary can “promulgate
regulations for the efficient enforcement of this Act.” See Thomas W. Merrill
& Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: the Original
Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 514 (2002).
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pharmaceutical manufacturer complete extensive safety and
efficacy testing prior to submission to the FDA for review and
27
approval.
Recent estimates indicate that the process of
preparing a new drug for review and then receiving FDA
28
approval takes approximately eight and one half years. At the
outset of the process, even before any human clinical trials may
begin, the pioneer firm must generate data on the drug’s
chemical structure, safety, efficacy, and toxicology both in vitro
29
and in animals. Once human studies begin, they are broken
30
down into three phases. Phase I trials are mainly designed to
generate data from a small test population (generally less than
100 subjects) regarding potential side effects as well as
31
Phase II trials are
metabolism and pharmacologic data.
conducted on a larger population (generally several hundred)
32
and are designed mainly to test the effectiveness of the drug.
Finally, Phase III trials are conducted involving a much larger
test population (generally thousands of subjects) than either of
33
This phase is intended to reconfirm
the previous phases.
previous efficacy and effectiveness data as well as obtain data
on the pharmaceutical’s adverse event profile over a longer
34
time frame. Upon completion of these three phases, a New
Drug Application (NDA) is filed with the FDA. The NDA
35
includes detailed information obtained from all three phases.
The FDA then begins its process of review and approval. The
approval time after submission is currently two and a half
36
years.
Currently, the FDA is asking some drug companies to

27. Prior to the FFDCA, there were no regulations covering the
development of pharmaceutical products. The initial FDA Act covered only
safety requirements. This changed in 1962, when the FDA began to require
efficacy information as well. See Reid, supra note 10, at 313.
28. LEVY, supra note 22, at 182.
29. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2002).
30. See id. § 312.21.
31. Id. § 312.21(a).
32. Id. § 312.21(b).
33. Id. § 312.21(c).
34. Id. Phase I trials generally last one year, Phase II trials last two
years and Phase III trials last three years. LEVY, supra note 22, at 183.
35. See 21 U.S.C. §355(a), (b) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2002).
36. LEVY, supra note 22, at 183. Note that aforementioned time frames do
not include the pre-clinical stages of pharmaceutical development. When this
is considered, the total time from initial compound synthesis to FDA approval
increases to almost 15 years. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 183.
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37

double the size of Phase III trials. This is true despite the fact
that drug companies already test drugs on an average of 5,000
38
patients, compared to only 1,500 in the 1970s.
2. Hatch – Waxman Act
Prior to the early 1980’s, there were few generic
39
competitors for brand-name pharmaceuticals.
Largely in
response to the public’s perception that health care costs were
spiraling out of control, the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed,
40
This
amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
was viewed as a compromise between brand-name
41
Essentially,
manufacturers and generic manufacturers.
generic manufacturers benefited from changes that expedited
the process of obtaining FDA approval for generic
pharmaceuticals and brand-name manufacturers obtained
42
provisions that increased the effective length of their patents.
Since its passing, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been hailed
43
The
as the “most important consumer bill of the decade.”
Hatch-Waxman Act attempted to reshape the statutory

37. Gottlieb, supra note 12.
38. Id.
39. When this legislation was passed in 1984, eight percent of the
pharmaceutical market consisted of generic drugs. See Melissa K. Davis,
Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand name Drug Companies in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 365 (1995). Prior to the HatchWaxman Act, prescribing generics tended to be an afterthought for physicians.
This largely resulted from physicians facing little pressure to prescribe a
lower-cost alternative because, prior to managed care’s dominance in the
health care industry, physicians were rarely associated with managed care
organizations and were free to prescribe more costly brand-name
pharmaceuticals.
In addition, insurance companies rarely reimbursed
patients for prescriptions and thus paid little attention to the cost of
pharmaceuticals.
Furthermore, antisubstitution laws often prevented
physicians from asking patients if they preferred to use a generic medication
in lieu of a more costly brand-name pharmaceutical. See Jaclyn L. Miller,
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The Elimination of
Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91,
92-93 (2002).
40. See Reid, supra note 10, at 313. Brand-name manufacturers were
concerned that the time required to comply with the increasingly lengthy FDA
approval requirements left insufficient time to recoup development costs. This
resulted in a belief that there would soon be little hope for profits to fund
future research. See id.
41. See Davis, supra note 39, at 363.
42. See id.
43. David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 324 (2000) (citing Senator Orrin Hatch’s
comments).
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landscape of patent laws and FDA regulation over the
44
pharmaceutical development and approval process.
The
objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act were twofold: 1) make
lower-priced generic versions of brand-name pharmaceuticals
45
more widely available; and 2) provide adequate incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of new
46
drugs.
To accomplish these broad objectives, the Hatch-Waxman
Act included five key provisions: (1) Generic drug
manufacturers were allowed to use brand-name drugs that
were still protected by patents solely to gather data to obtain
47
FDA approval for the generic drug. 2) An Abbreviated New
Drug Application (“ANDA”) was created for generic drugs to
48
This
streamline the FDA approval process for generics.
allows a generic manufacturer to use the safety and efficacy
data previously gathered by the applicable brand-name drug
49
company. 3) A 180–day market exclusivity period was created

44. See id.
45. See Reid, supra note 10, at 320. In 1984, the FDA estimated that
there were 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had expired for which there
was no generic equivalent. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12,
at 4. There were three key difficulties that generic manufacturers faced in the
pre-Hatch-Waxman-Act environment. First, they were required to perform
their own safety and efficacy studies (which were very costly and timeconsuming, a fact with which brand-name manufacturers were all too
familiar). Second, there was no streamlined procedure to approve generic
versions of pharmaceuticals whose patents had expired. Finally, the generic
company could not begin the FDA approval process until after the relevant
brand-name patent had expired. See id. at 3-4.
46. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 4. Brand-name
pharmaceutical companies usually obtain patents prior to FDA approval of the
drug. The effective term of the patent is then shortened by the time required
for the FDA to ensure safety and efficacy. In essence, the patent on a
pharmaceutical begins to run before the manufacturer can begin to market
and sell the product. This results in a shorter effective patent term when
compared to other industries. See id.
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (“It shall not be an act of infringement
to . . . use . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. . . .”). Thus, generic
manufacturers may immediately begin using the brand-name drug they were
trying to copy rather than having to wait until the brand-name patent expires.
The generic manufacturer may thus have a generic equivalent ready to
market as soon as the brand-name patent expired.
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
49. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 5. This expedited
the generic approval process and allowed generic manufacturers to forgo
expensive clinical trials. Id. As codified, the generic manufacturer must
demonstrate that the generic product has the same active ingredient(s), route
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for the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA for a specific
50
drug. This allows that generic manufacturer to market their
51
drug without any other generic competition for 180 days. 4)
The brand-name drug manufacturer was granted the possibility
of additional patent protection for time lost during the lengthy
52
5) Finally, generic
process of drug approval by the FDA.
manufacturers, upon filing an ANDA, were required to file one
of four possible certifications regarding the status of the related
53
The four possible certifications by the
brand-name patent.
generic manufacturer are as follows: 1) that the brand-name
54
2) that the brand-name patent has
patent was never filed;
55
expired; 3) that the brand-name patent has not yet expired,
56
but will do so on a particular date; or 4) that the brand-name
patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by the proposed
generic version (also known as a “Paragraph IV
57
Certification”). If the generic manufacturer files a Paragraph
IV Certification, the brand-name manufacturer then has fortyfive days in which to bring a patent infringement suit against
58
the generic ANDA applicant. When such a suit is filed, the

of administration, dosage form, and strength as the brand-name drug. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) & (iii). Additionally, the generic must demonstrate
“bioequivalence,” which means that the rate and extent of absorption of the
generic drug is not significantly different from that of the brand-name drug.
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
51. Id. The first generic manufacturer is essentially granted a “minimonopoly” from any generic competitors. Although the generic manufacturer
will have to compete against the brand-name drug, because the cost of
producing a generic is significantly lower, the generic manufacturer is highly
likely to be able to undercut the brand-name price, while still making a large
profit margin on the generic.
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) & (c) (2000). This patent term extension,
however, has not been as forthcoming as brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers had hoped. For example, of the ninety applications for the
extension of a pharmaceutical patent during 1998, only two were granted the
full period of extension. See Miller, supra note 39, at 100.
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000).
54. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I).
55. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II). If the generic manufacturer certifies
under either of the first two certification options, the FDA may approve the
ANDA immediately. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
56. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III). If this certification is filed, the FDA may
approve the ANDA to be effective on the date the brand-name patent is
certified to expire. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
57. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). This certification is the source of much
related litigation. See discussion infra Part I.C.
58. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If the brand-name manufacturer does not
file such a lawsuit, the ANDA will be immediately approved after forty-five
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FDA cannot approve the generic ANDA for thirty months.
This automatic stay may be supplemented by additional thirty60
month stays.
The Hatch-Waxman Act appears to have been successful in
accomplishing at least some of its original objectives.
Consumer access to lower-priced generic drugs has increased
and the United States continues to be the world leader in
61
For example,
pharmaceutical innovation and development.
62
generic prescriptions now comprise over 47% of prescriptions.
This compares to only 19% in 1984 when the Hatch-Waxman
63
Moreover, prior to the Hatch-Waxman
Act was introduced.
Act, approximately 35% of pharmaceuticals no longer under
64
patent protection had generic counterparts. Today, virtually
65
all do.
Although increased access to equivalent generic
medications at a lower cost has been an unquestionable benefit
to consumers, the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have a dark
side. The very rules that purported to increase competition
have perhaps not only increased incentives for brand-name and
generic manufacturers to engage in collusive behavior, but may
have also encouraged generic manufacturers to file frivolous
66
In addition, as reported by the Congressional
lawsuits.
Budget Office, the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have tilted the

days. See id.
59. See id. If a court finds the brand-name patent invalid or not infringed
by the generic drug, the FDA’s approval of the ANDA will become effective on
the date of such ruling. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). Furthermore, if the patent
term was scheduled to expire prior to the end of the thirty-month extension,
the ANDA would still be approved when the patent term was scheduled to
end. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii. Thus, while the
thirty-month extension does prevent generic entry into the market, it does not
increase the length of the patent term. It simply prevents the generic
manufacturer from marketing a competing product while the infringement
litigation occurs.
60. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at iii. After the
generic manufacturer files the ANDA, it is possible for the brand-name
manufacturer to file an additional patent over the drug at issue. This forces
the generic manufacturer to re-certify the ANDA, which gives the brand-name
manufacturer another opportunity to file a suit and begin a new thirty-month
stay. See id.
61. See Balto, supra note 43, at 324.
62. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at i.
63. See id.
64. See CBO, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37 (July
1998) [hereinafter CBO DRUG STUDY].
65. See id.
66. See discussion infra Part III.
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balance too far in favor of generic manufacturers at the expense
67
of brand-name manufacturers.
3. Antitrust Laws
A market economy operates on the assumption that
competitive markets will invariably result in the most efficient
allocation of resources, the largest variety of consumer choices,
68
and the lowest prices possible. Antitrust laws, which seek to
encourage and preserve the competitive marketplace, target
69
There are
private conduct that disrupts market efficiency.
three main statutory antitrust provisions that define unlawful
conduct: 1) Section 1 of the Sherman Act; 2) Section 2 of the
70
Sherman Act; and 3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
71
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” In order
to establish a violation of Section 1, a “contract,
72
Thus,
combination . . . or conspiracy” must be established.
bilateral conduct involving two or more entities is required. In
the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, this conduct might
entail a generic manufacturer agreeing with a brand-name
manufacturer that the generic manufacturer will not enter the
market with a generic copy in return for payments from the
brand-name manufacturer.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that, “Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . .
73
Unlike Section 1,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”
Section 2 of the Sherman Act can be applied to conduct by a
single firm (monopolization) as well as conduct by two or more
74
firms (combination or conspiracy).

67. See CBO DRUG STUDY, supra note 64, at ix.
68. See David A. Balto, Intellectual Property: General Antitrust Principles,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 2002, at 11 (Practising Law Institute
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook
Series No. G0-0119, June - July 2002).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
73. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
74. See Balto, supra note 68, at 12.
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes stock and asset
acquisitions that, “in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
75
to tend to create a monopoly.” Under this section, stock or
asset mergers or acquisitions of one pharmaceutical company
by another may be subject to scrutiny depending on the effect
on the relevant product and geographic market.
These three antitrust statutes combine to create risks in
the Hatch-Waxman-Act environment for violations by both
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers. One
of the antitrust problems in the pharmaceutical industry
results from exit payments by brand-name manufacturers to a
potential generic competitor that either exits or never enters
76
the relevant market. This payment is a “horizontal market–
77
division agreement” that antitrust laws find per se illegal.
Consumers end up paying more and buying less while the
78
Another potential
conspirators share in monopoly profits.
antitrust problem arises when a brand-name manufacturer and
a generic manufacturer conspire to have the generic
manufacturer withdraw a patent challenge in return for cash
payments.
This collusion fails to trigger the 180-day
exclusivity for the first generic to file the ANDA and delays
79
generic entry into the market indefinitely.

75. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
76. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747, 748 (2002).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Essentially what occurs is as follows. The generic manufacturer files
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification as discussed supra Part I.A.2.
The brand-name manufacturer then files an infringement lawsuit within
forty-five days, which begins the automatic thirty-month stay. In addition, the
filing of the ANDA by the generic manufacturer creates a 180-day period of
market exclusivity for the generic manufacturer as specified in 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2000). The key point is that the 180-day period does not
begin until “the first commercial marketing of the drug” that was produced by
the first generic manufacturer to file the ANDA. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
Therefore, if the first generic manufacturer withdraws its Paragraph IV
patent challenge, it is essentially agreeing to not market the product. By not
ever marketing the product, the start of the 180-day period is never triggered
and all other generic competitors are prevented from having a competing
ANDA approved by the FDA. Without an approved ANDA, no generic
competitors can market their product to compete with the brand-name drug.
The result is that the patent term extends beyond the statutory allowed period
and results in the brand-name manufacturer earning higher returns than a
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4. Patent Laws
Patents are essentially legal monopolies that society
tolerates in the belief that innovation would not otherwise
80
occur in a free market. The pharmaceutical industry presents
a classic example of a free market failure. Without patent
protection, anyone could copy a drug as soon as it was
marketed. This realization is important because, unlike the
cost of producing an automobile, for example, the ingredient
and manufacturing cost of producing a pharmaceutical is
81
generally quite small. The majority of the costs of producing a
pharmaceutical are incurred during the development, testing,
and approval of the compound that will later be manufactured
82
If a generic manufacturer could simply copy the
and sold.
formulation immediately after it was developed or marketed,
they could manufacture it and sell it for a significantly lower
price than the brand-name manufacturer. The brand-name
manufacturer, of course, would need to recover the costs of
developing and testing the drug. Obviously, they would be
unable to recover their costs and produce any profit, resulting
in less incentive to develop new pharmaceuticals. Ultimately,
innovation and the consumer would suffer. In the case of
pharmaceuticals, although there may be altruistic motives,
profit is the principal lure enticing drug manufacturers to
invest large sums of time and money toward the discovery of
83
Patent law offers the protection allowing this
new drugs.
investment to occur.
All patent laws are enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8,
of the Constitution, which provides, “The Congress shall have
the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and

competitive market would allow.
80. Society tolerates a firm having monopoly power due to the belief that,
unless the firm is able to earn monopoly profits for some period of time, less
innovation will occur. See Crane, supra note 76, at 754.
81. See Robert H. Balance, Market and Industrial Structure, in
CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE
REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 97 (Peter Davis ed., 1996) (Showing
that the manufacturing [i.e. labor and material] costs for pharmaceuticals for
brand-name manufacturers were approximately 25% of total costs during
1989).
82. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 175-78.
83. See F.M. SCHERER, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH ECONOMICS 1317 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., vol. 1B 2000).
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Discoveries.”
Under this authority, Congress has enacted
laws allowing the owner of a patent to exclude others from
infringing that patent by making, using, or selling the patented
85
invention. The grant of a patent is intended to increase the
86
perceived reward to inventors.
The philosophy is that the
greater the potential reward, the more firms will be willing to
87
This goal is
invest in new technologies and innovation.
accomplished by granting the patent for a limited period of
time.
After the patent expires, the previously protected
information is publicly available for all to use.
The patent term for all products is currently twenty years
88
Prior to the
from the filing of the patent application.
twentieth century, pharmaceutical manufacturers (like any
other manufacturer) were able to use the entire patent term to
89
However, with the advent of the
market their product.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938,
pharmaceutical manufacturers were effectively prevented from
utilizing the full length of the patent term for product
90
The
FDCA
required
pharmaceutical
marketing.
manufacturers to spend time proving a drug is safe and
effective prior to marketing the drug – time that is effectively
taken away from the patent term during which they can
91
recover their costs. This process has been estimated to leave
only ten years for pharmaceutical manufacturers to recoup
92
their costs.
B. ANTITRUST RISKS
There are three main risks that the Hatch-Waxman Act
appears to have created for anticompetitive behavior. First, as
previously noted, FDA approval of an ANDA filed by a generic
manufacturer cannot occur during the automatic thirty-month
93
stay of approval. This delay provides a significant enticement
for litigation that may have little relationship to the underlying

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
These statutes have been codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-351 (2000).
See Crane, supra note 76, at 754.
See id.
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
See Miller, supra note 39, at 95.
See id. at 95-6.
See id. at 96.
See id. at 98.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
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94

brand-name patent.
Essentially, the brand-name
manufacturer is granted a preliminary injunction without any
95
By filing litigation solely to protect its
judicial review.
monopoly position, the brand-name manufacturer runs the risk
entering into an illegal restraint of trade.
Second, the 180-day exclusivity period for the first generic
challenger does not have any requirement that it ever be
96
triggered. Thus, if the infringement litigation is ongoing—or
if the generic manufacturer has yet to launch its product—the
generic market is essentially closed to other generic
97
competitors. The brand-name drug continues to have patent
98
protection, regardless of its actual validity.
This fact is a
significant enticement for a brand-name manufacturer and a
99
generic manufacturer to enter into a collusive agreement.
Third, because multiple thirty-month stays of approval are
100
allowed, there is an incentive for brand-name manufacturers
to file either patent extensions or additional patents over
pharmaceuticals when their original patent term is about to
end.
C. RECENT ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The FTC’s recent activity has challenged alleged
anticompetitive agreements between pioneer and generic
manufacturers. These actions address agreements reached in
the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The FTC has been
concerned that some firms may be exploiting the regulatory
scheme by forming agreements to delay or prevent the
introduction of generic drugs into the pharmaceutical market.
Actions have been initiated against Schering-Plough, Hoechst
Marion Roussell, and Abbott–Geneva in the past several years.


94. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 327.
95. See id.
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
99. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 327-28. For example, the generic
manufacturer could agree to never launch its product, effectively excluding
other generics from entering the market. This practice is exactly what Barr
Laboratories has often been accused of. See infra note 159 and accompanying
text.
100. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at iii.
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1. Schering-Plough
The first action entails two agreements involving Schering101
Plough.
Both agreements regard generic versions of a
102
Schering-Plough medication called K-Dur 20.
In the first agreement, Upsher-Smith filed an ANDA with
a Paragraph IV Certification for its generic version of K-Dur
103
Within forty-five days, Schering-Plough filed suit against
20.
104
Upsher-Smith for patent infringement.
However,
immediately prior to the trial, the two companies settled and
105
Schering-Plough agreed to pay $60 million to Upsher-Smith.
In return, Upsher-Smith agreed not to enter the market with
106
any version of K-Dur 20 prior to September 2001.
107
The second agreement involved ESI Lederle.
ESI
planned on releasing its generic version of K-Dur 20 after
108
However,
Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period ended.
since Upsher-Smith had yet to introduce its generic version of
109
K-Dur 20 into the market, the 180-day period had not begun.
Furthermore, since Upsher-Smith agreed not to market the
generic until September 2001, it would be almost six years
110
until ESI would be able to market its generic product.
Schering-Plough then filed suit against ESI to trigger the
111
ESI then entered into an agreement with
thirty-month stay.
112
Schering-Plough for a payment of at least $20 million.

101. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 38, & 51, In re Schering-Plough Corp., FTC
Docket No. 9297 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Schering-Plough Complaint],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3cmp.pdf.
102. See id. at ¶ 1.
103. See id. at ¶ 38.
104. See id. at ¶ 39.
105. See id. at ¶ 44.
106. See id. Schering-Plough also received licenses for five of Upsher’s
products. See id. However, none of the licenses were ever used in any
meaningful way. See id. at ¶ 46. This gave the impression that the licenses
were simply included in an attempt to hide the true nature of the agreement.
See id. at ¶¶ 45-46.
107. See id. at ¶ 51. ESI Lederle, Inc. is a division of American Home
Products. See id. at ¶ 6.
108. See id. at ¶ 52.
109. See id. at ¶ 60.
110. See id. at ¶ 44 and compare with ¶¶ 51-60 (ESI had submitted its
ANDA to the FDA on December 29, 1995).
111. See id. at ¶ 53.
112. See id. at ¶ 55. As with Upsher-Smith, Schering-Plough also
“purchased” two licenses from ESI, but has yet to utilize either of them. See
id. at ¶¶ 55-56.
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In March 2001, in response to the agreement between ESI
and Schering-Plough, the FTC charged Schering-Plough and
Upsher-Smith with engaging in unfair methods of competition
designed to delay the entry of a generic version of K-Dur 20
113
Recently, this charge has been
into the U.S. market.
114
dismissed by one of the FTC’s administrative law judges. The
FTC estimated the agreements Schering-Plough had with
115
The
Upsher-Smith and ESI “cost consumers $100 million.”
116
FTC is currently appealing this decision; however, if they
lose, the result could open a new pathway for similar
117
agreements between brand-name and generic manufacturers.
The FTC is concerned that this ruling implies “the agreement
between Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith was a reasonable
118
way to settle the patent infringement suit,” which is contrary
119
to the FTC’s philosophy.
2. Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc.
Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc. (“HMRI”) manufactured and
120
sold Cardizem CD, a heart medication.
In September 1995,
Andrx filed an ANDA for its generic version of Cardizem and
then claimed that its version did not infringe on the Cardizem
121
HMRI then filed a timely patent infringement
CD patents.
suit against Andrx, which triggered the thirty-month stay of
122
In September 1997,
FDA final approval of Andrx’s ANDA.
prior to the expiration of the thirty-month stay, an agreement

113. See id. at ¶¶ 63-67.
114. See FTC to Appeal Schering, Upsher-Smith Dismissal, 34
WASHINGTON DRUG LETTER, no. 27, July 8, 2002, at 2 (“Administrative Law
Judge Michael Chappell citied [sic] a lack of evidence in the case and
dismissed the charges involving Schering and Upsher-Smith, as well as
similar charges against Schering related to an arrangement between the
company and ESI Lederle.”).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. The FTC believes that as a result of the agreement between the
companies, consumers were denied the benefit of competition between brandname and generic manufacturers, leaving less choice in the marketplace and
having to pay higher prices for pharmaceuticals. See Schering-Plough
Complaint, at ¶ 67.
120. See Complaint at ¶ 1, In re Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc., FTC Docket
No. 9293 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm.
121. See id. at ¶ 17.
122. See id. at ¶ 18.
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123

was reached between Andrx and HMRI.
In this agreement,
Andrx agreed to delay the marketing of its generic version of
Cardizem CD and HMRI agreed to make large monetary
124
Soon thereafter, federal, state, and
payments to Andrx.
private plaintiffs brought class action and individual lawsuits
125
for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suits were
eventually consolidated and the trial judge granted summary
judgment, stating that the agreement was unlawful on its face
126
The FTC also
and was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
conducted a separate investigation that eventually resulted in
a consent decree limiting future agreements between the two
127
companies.
3. Abbott – Geneva
Abbott is a major pharmaceutical company whose patented
drug, Hytrin, accounted for over twenty percent of its $7.7
128
billion in United States revenues in 1998.
Geneva is a
leading manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals in the United
129
Geneva was the first manufacturer to file an ANDA
States.
for a generic version of Hytrin, and, in April 1996, Geneva filed
130
Abbott sued
a Paragraph IV Certification with the FDA.
Geneva for patent infringement, which triggered the thirtymonth stay of FDA approval of Geneva’s generic version of
131
Abbott and Geneva then entered into an agreement
Hytrin.

123. See id at ¶ 23.
124. See id at ¶¶ 23-26. These payments amounted to over $10 million per
quarter. See id.
125. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp.2d 682, 684-85
(E.D. Mich. 2000).
126. See id. at 685, 689 (“[T]he HMRI/Andrx Agreement is an agreement
between horizontal competitors that allocates the entire United States market
for Cardizem CD and its bioequivalents to Defendant HMRI, and thus
constitutes a restraint of trade that has long been held illegal per se.. . .”).
127. Consent Agreement Resolves Complaint Against Pharmaceutical
Companies Hoescht Marion Roussell, Inc. and Andrx Corp., Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Apr. 2, 2001, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/hoechst.htm (“Under
terms of the agreement, the companies [are] barred from entering into
arrangements in the future that have the purpose or effect of delaying the
entry of generic pharmaceuticals.”).
128. Complaint at ¶ 1, In re Abbott Labs., FTC Docket No. C-3946 (May 22,
2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946omplaint.htm.
129. See id. at ¶ 3.
130. See id. at ¶ 17.
131. See id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Geneva had filed certifications for both a tablet
and capsule form of its generic Hytrin. Through an oversight, Abbott
neglected to file a patent infringement suit over the capsule form. As a result,
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whereby Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month
132
until a judgment in the patent dispute was issued.
This
agreement did not settle the suit; it simply delayed generic
133
On the heels of a Federal Trade
entry into the market.
Commission investigation, the two companies terminated their
agreement and Geneva finally brought their generic to
134
The antitrust case eventually settled due to a FTC
market.
135
consent decree.
This agreement limited similar
arrangements between the two companies in the future and,
while no financial penalties were levied, the FTC implied that
136
similar conduct in the future might lead to them.
Based upon these cases and their report, the FTC has
apparently concluded that these types of agreements to resolve
patent disputes are highly suspect and perhaps per se illegal.
FTC staff commented further at various ABA programs that
the commission “has great skepticism toward such
137
This leads to their apparent conclusion that
agreements.”
there is a violation of antitrust laws if the following two events
138
occur: first, a patent holder (i.e. brand-name manufacturer)
“who occupies its market position in substantial part because of
its patent rights pays an alleged infringer” (i.e. generic
manufacture), and second, the “alleged infringer then
139
withholds its product from the market.”
The above mentioned litigation has led to discussion of how
the Hatch-Waxman Act might be improved to mitigate these
140
risks. In July 2002, the FTC released its proposed changes.

the thirty-month stay applied only to the tablet form. See id.
132. See id. at ¶¶ 26-27.
133. See id. at ¶ 29. Geneva’s CEO publicly remarked that the agreement
gave Geneva “‘the best of all worlds’ because Geneva obtained a risk-free
‘monetary settlement on an ongoing basis until the litigation was resolved’ and
could still market its product exclusively for 180 days after the litigation was
over.” Id.
134. See id. at ¶ 33.
135. See Balto, supra note 43, at 338.
136. See id. at 338-39.
137. Yee Wah Chin & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Unilateral Technology
Suppression: Appropriate Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies, in 41ST
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING, at
1036 (Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B0-01C7, Jan. – Feb. 2002).
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii.
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II. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
141

The FTC study began in April 2001.
Its purpose was to
provide a “more complete picture” of how well generic
competition was working under the provisions of the Hatch142
The report was intended to help determine
Waxman Act.
whether, among other things, the types of agreements the FTC
has challenged between branded and generic drug makers are
143
For
isolated instances or typical of industry practices.
example, the FTC wanted to know the frequency with which
patent cases are settled as compared to litigated to a final court
144
decision. Since last May, the FTC has tracked patent listings
in the Orange Book, the timeliness of the listings and the
145
The FTC issued two
number of challenges by generics.
recommendations aimed at correcting the deficiencies in the
current statutory environment regulating pharmaceutical drug
146
development.
A. RECOMMENDATION ONE
The first recommendation is to permit only one automatic
147
30-month stay per drug product in accordance with ANDA.
This recommendation is aimed at resolving infringement
disputes over patents listed in the Orange Book subsequent to
148
Currently a
the filing date of the generic applicant’s ANDA.
brand-name manufacturer can list additional patents for
brand-name drugs in the Orange Book after the generic
149
This listing forces the
applicant has already filed an ANDA.
generic manufacturer to submit a new Paragraph IV
Certification, which would trigger an additional 30-month stay
for the same drug (assuming the patent holder timely files

141. See id. at 1.
142. Id. Specifically, the Study was to review “generic entry prior to
expiration” of the corresponding brand-name patent. Id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at ii.
145. See id. After the United States Patent Office approves a brand-name
pharmaceutical patent, it is then listed in the FDA’s Orange Book subsequent
to FDA approval for use in humans. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(i) (2000).
Once a drug is listed in the Orange Book, any potential competitors must first
resort to the ANDA process. See supra Part I.A.2.
146. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii and vi.
147. See id. at ii.
148. See id. at iii.
149. See id.
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150

suit).
The FTC study indicated that this situation occurred
eight times and resulted in additional delays for generic drugs,
ranging in duration from four to forty months beyond the
151
In the four cases that eventually
original extension period.
went to court, the later issued patents were found to be “invalid
152
or not infringed by the ANDA.”
B. SECOND RECOMMENDATION
The second recommendation relates to the 180-day
exclusivity period and encourages Congress to pass legislation
“to require brand name companies and first generic applicants
153
Since
to provide copies of certain agreements” to the FTC.
these agreements may be anticompetitive and raise antitrust
issues, this recommendation is aimed at providing the FTC
with copies to allow the FTC to perform more timely reviews of
154
Since these agreements often involve the
the agreements.
settlement of ANDA-related infringement suits, they result in a
brand-name manufacturer paying a generic manufacturer to
155
This practice effectively parks the
delay their market entry.
180-day exclusivity period and prevents subsequent generic
156
As part of its study,
competitors from entering the market.
the FTC examined twenty settlement agreements for ANDApatent cases, and found that fourteen of them had the potential
157
Finally, the FTC
to delay the onset of the 180-day period.
said it should be made clear that the 180-day exclusivity period
starts running under the following circumstances: a generic
company begins to sell a brand-name drug; any court issues a
decision as to the propriety of a patent; or a court dismisses a
158
declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction.
III. DISCUSSION
The FTC recommendations largely focus on the conduct of
the brand-name manufacturers. This approach is appropriate
to the extent that brand-name manufacturers are to blame for

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id.
See id.
Id. at iv.
Id. at vi.
See id. at viii.
See id.
See id.
See id. at vii.
See id. at ix-x.
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the problems in the pharmaceutical industry. However, there
is evidence that at least some problems result from actions of
generic manufacturers, and others result from the structure of
159
Nonetheless,
the pharmaceutical regulatory environment.
the FTC appears unable to extricate itself from the belief that
competition in the pharmaceutical industry will improve if only
160
generic manufacturers are given additional advantages.
Even if true at one time, this does not appear to be true
anymore. There are several reasons to question the wisdom of
further tilting the balance in favor of generic manufacturers at
the expense of brand-name manufacturers.
However, when one looks at the FTC’s report, it is possible
for it to appear as though there is not a significant problem in
the first place. Even in this litigation-rich environment the
FTC could only find eight pharmaceuticals, where brand-name
161
manufacturers may have received multiple 30-month stays.
However, even when an extra thirty months are granted,
contrary to the popular perception, brand-name pharmaceutical
companies are not getting an extra thirty months of patent life
on top of twenty years of protection. In actuality, the average

159. For an example of this result, one need look no further than the case
of Barr Laboratories. Although it is technically a generic manufacturer, the
company has earned over 65% of its revenues from “settlements” with brandname companies and not from actually selling generic drugs. See Bethany
McLean, A Bitter Pill, FORTUNE, August 13, 2001, at 122.
160. This thought pattern is certainly an easy trap to fall into since there is
much to like about generic drugs: they are cheaper and they generally do the
same thing that the more expensive brand-name drug does. However, it does
ignore the fact that generic manufacturers are completely dependant on
brand-name manufacturers to continue to innovate in order that the generic
manufacturers will continue to have a stream of medications to copy. This fact
speaks to the need for balance in any statutory adjustments. Just as generic
manufacturers are dependant upon brand-name manufacturers for new
products to copy, brand-name manufacturers are dependant upon innovation
in order to survive. If they cannot profitably produce new and useful
pharmaceuticals, when the generic competitor enters the market, the brandname manufacturer will not survive.
161. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra, note 11, at 40. There have
been a total of 8,259 generic applications since the Hatch-Waxman Act was
See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust
passed.
Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the
th
Judiciary, 107 Cong. 4-5 (2001) (prepared statement of Molly Boast, Director,
Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade commission, Washington, DC).
Considering that from this, there have only been fifty-eight related court
decisions and eight “problem” cases identified by the FTC, it seems plausible
that the Hatch-Waxman Act may actually be functioning relatively well. See
id.
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effective patent life for pharmaceuticals is ten years.
Even
though 30-month stays may occasionally occur, the effective
patent life is still far less than the nearly twenty years given to
other industries. For example, in the FTC report, the brandname drug, Paxil, was identified as having four 30-month
163
However, even with the stays, Paxil will have far less
stays.
than twenty years of effective patent life due to the length of
164
time required for that product’s development and approval.
All this indicates that, to the extent the study proposes to
further harness brand-name manufacturers with statutory
regulations, it may have been much ado about nothing.
Furthermore, the study fails to consider that generic
manufacturers already enjoy a significant advantage from the
Hatch-Waxman Act that competitors in other industries do not
posess. For example, in no other industry is a competitor able
to use its competition’s product to develop its own product and
rely on the innovator’s safety data. These recommendations
simply add to the arsenal of generic manufacturers. This fact
can be demonstrated by the problem of frivolous ANDA filings
by generic manufacturers claiming that a brand-name drug
patent is invalid. This practice has increased recently, and
165
As the
generics are challenging patents earlier and earlier.
Hatch-Waxman
Act
stands
now,
brand-name
drug
manufacturers are given all the challenges they need to fend off
frivolous filings. However, if the FTC’s first recommendation
became law, the brand-name manufacturer would be limited to
just one 30-month challenge.
The FTC’s second recommendation would appear to be
appropriate to the extent that the FTC will use this

162. See Miller, supra note 39, at 98.
163. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY supra, note 12, at 51.
164. Paxil received FDA approval in December 1992. See id. However, it
lost patent protection in August 2001. See Jeremy Shure, Select Recent Court
Decisions, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 136 (2002). As a result, Paxil only received
approximately eight and a half years of effective patent life even after
receiving four supposed 30-month extensions.
165. See Jayne O’Donnell, Makers of Generic Drugs Take Some Legal Heat,
Too, USA TODAY, June 5, 2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/health/2002-06-06-generics-legal.htm
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2003). Essentially, when a generic manufacturer files an
ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification, regardless of whether there is any
merit to the generic manufacturer’s claim, the brand-name manufacturer must
initiate a lawsuit or the FDA will approve the generic competitor regardless of
the claim’s merit after forty-five days have expired. See 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000).
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information on generic and brand-name agreements to stop
166
anticompetitive actions similar to the ones described above.
However, this recommendation does nothing to prevent the
filing of frivolous ANDA and Paragraph IV Certifications by a
generic manufacturer. The generic manufacturer has a strong
incentive to do so via the 180-day exclusivity period. This
marketing exclusivity period is a considerable reward for the
generic manufacturer, and there is virtually no consequence for
a frivolous filing. Since the generic product is not on the
market, there will be no infringement damages for the brandname manufacturer to recover. What might be more effective
to prevent this practice is to have the FDA review the ANDA
filing to ensure the generic manufacturer has not filed a
frivolous claim.
Doing so would still allow generic
manufacturers to have their 180-day period of market
exclusivity, while providing some protection to the brand-name
manufacturer against frivolous patent challenges during the
ANDA process.
The original objective of the Hatch-Waxman Act was “to
balance the interests” of generic manufactures with that of
167
However, according to a recent
brand-name manufacturers.
study by the Congressional Budget Office, this balance has not
been achieved, tilting instead in favor of generic
168
This balance would become even more tilted
manufacturers.
if the FTC’s recommendations are accepted. This result is
perhaps due to the FTC’s belief that generic drugs offer
significant cost savings over brand-name products. However,
this assertion may be suspect. Generics are certainly cheaper
than brand-name drugs, but that statistic fails to take into
account the total cost of care as well as the impact on patient
health. Studies have indicated that generic drugs may actually
169
This is because, despite
raise the cost of total health care.

166. See discussion infra Part I.C.
167. CBO DRUG STUDY, supra note 64, at 3.
168. See id. at ix (stating that “the cost to producers of brand name drugs
from faster generic entry has roughly offset the benefit they receive from
extended patent terms” and “the greater competition from generic drugs has
somewhat eroded [the brand-name producers’] expected returns from research
and development”).
169. See Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth
Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at
241 (2001); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People Out
of Hospitals?, 86 AM. ECON. REV., 384 (1996). These studies show that
patients who were restricted to older, generic asthma and anti-depressant
drugs wound up being sicker and spending more on hospitals, doctors, and

2003]

HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

391

the cost savings in the short-term, there is a great incentive to
continue using these cheap generic medications rather than the
new pharmaceuticals that are developed.
This projected
increase in cost is certainly not a reason to stop producing and
encouraging generic medications; however, it does indicate a
need for a balance that encourages a competitive marketplace
for both generic and brand-name manufacturers. Generics are
never new drugs or better treatments. They are cheaper for
consumers, but their continued viability is entirely dependant
on new drug innovation. Furthermore, if one must choose
between favoring brand-name or generic manufacturers, brandname manufacturers should be preferred. The profits a generic
manufacturer realizes are unlikely to be used for research and
development of new pharmaceuticals. Conversely, the very
existence of brand-name manufacturers is dependent entirely
on the development of a steady stream of new and innovative
products for the market. As such, the marketplace is likely to
demand that profits be invested back into the research and
development pipeline.
The resulting innovation is what
reduces total healthcare costs and improves a consumer’s
quality of life.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s primary purpose was to decrease
the high cost of prescription drugs by increasing the
availability of cheaper generic versions while still encouraging
new drug development. In the beginning, the Hatch-Waxman
Act achieved this objective, as the market realized an
unprecedented increase in generic drug entry. However, this
objective is becoming more difficult to achieve as some brandname and generic manufacturers have found ways to thwart
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s intentions through collusive
agreements. As the cost of drug research and development
rises, the pharmaceutical industry will feel increasing pressure
to capitalize as much as possible on drug patents. This
pressure can lead to anticompetitive agreements that may
violate antitrust laws.
However,
many
brand-name
pharmaceutical
manufacturers feel threatened by potential infringement
through generic competitors’ frivolous ANDA filings. As a
result, there is incentive to engage in potentially collusive

emergency rooms than those who used newer medicines.
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behavior to maintain their patent rights or, alternatively, to file
frivolous extension patents. When brand-name companies offer
settlements to generic companies they are often too lucrative to
ignore because they are usually more than the generic company
could make during its 180-day exclusivity period. The end
result of these agreements is that consumers pay higher prices
for brand-name pharmaceuticals and generic entry is prevented
or stalled.
To the extent that recent proposals by the FTC prevent
this result, they will benefit consumers.
However, the
proposals appear to focus mainly on the perceived
transgressions of brand-name manufacturers. The proposals
do not offer any solution for the significant problem of generic
companies filing frivolous ANDA claims against brand-name
manufacturer patents. These frivolous claims often result in
settlements because brand-name manufacturers feel that
paying off the generic company is less expensive than fighting a
frivolous patent suit. The FTC needs to remember that the
overall goal is to improve competition and the welfare of the
consumer and not simply to handicap brand-name
manufacturers while favoring generic manufacturers.

